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‘Red sanders mafia’ in South India: 
violence, electoral democracy and 
labour
David Picherit
This chapter offers insights into the material assemblage of red sanders 
smuggling, extending to its recruitment and labour processes and the role of 
electoral democracy in determining hierarchies and structures of power. By 
following a number of smugglers/politicians’ career trajectories, it explores 
how electoral politics and the red sanders mafia are entangled in relations 
of intreccio. It also reveals how the regulation of red sanders smuggling is 
deeply entrenched in the economic, cultural and political history of Rayala-
seema. The latter is further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of 
Veerappan is used to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region.
Background
The 2014 parliamentary elections in the state of Andhra Pradesh (South 
India) were preceded and followed by a series of reported murders in the 
Seshachalam forest in the region of Rayalaseema. Six months before the 
election dates, nine woodcutters were found dead along with two forest 
officials, whose genitals had been cut off. Seshachalam forest is the only 
place in the world where a particular species of sandalwood, known as 
red sanders, grows. This wood was listed as endangered in 1995 and 
protected by international conventions in 1998.1 From the early 2000s 
onward, local and small-scale red sanders smuggling has become glo-
balised traffic. Importantly, it has become a major source of political fund-
ing in the region. Highly valued on international markets, red sanders are 
cut, moved by sea, air and roads, and sold to global destinations, China in 
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particular. A year after the 2014 parliamentary election, the Red Sanders 
Anti-Smuggling Task Force (RSASTF) – implemented by the new Chief 
Minister, Chandrababu Naidu (from the Telugu Desam Party) – killed 20 
woodcutters. According to police sources, ‘smugglers linked to Veerap-
pan’ – the iconic South Indian sandalwood and ivory smuggler killed by 
police 10 years ago – were killed in an ‘encounter’.2 A number of investiga-
tions led by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) from human rights organ-
isations (such as the National Campaign for De-notified Tribes’ Human 
Rights (NCDNTHR)), however, came up with a different account. Their 
report describes the labourers as ‘poor’ and ‘passive victims’ and shows 
that the task force killed ‘20 poor migrant tribal woodcutters brought by 
middlemen from the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu’.3 Other media 
suggest instances of torture (Janardhanan 2015). The killings were fol-
lowed by a wave of arrests of the alleged smugglers between 2015 and 
2016. More than 7,000 people were arrested but the conviction rate was 
only 1 per cent in 2017 (Umashanker 2017). Significantly, three days 
after the mass killing, the Chief Minister argued for lifting the ban on sell-
ing red sanders and removing it from the international list of endangered 
wood (Vadlapatla 2015). His plan was to allow the state to sell red sand-
ers at global auctions in order to finance his populist promises to farmers, 
and to improve the finances of the new state of Andhra Pradesh after its 
bifurcation from Telangana.4 These two subsequent events indicate how 
political control over state violence and market regulation are central to 
the structuring and making of the red sanders illegal international trade.
Changing laws and altering regulations, defining and re-defining 
what is legal and what is illegal in the sandalwood business, is a process 
dating back to the colonial times (Raj 2014). A major step in such recon-
figurations was the 1998 decision to ban the red sanders trade. What was 
initially designed as a law to control deforestation contributed instead to 
creating a burgeoning illegal trade fostered by high international demand 
for red sanders. For Rayalaseema’s politicians-cum-business executives 
this new source of profit quickly became the new El Dorado: a source of 
criminal capital to be used to finance electoral politics as well as to make 
personal fortunes. It follows that by the mid-2000s, the struggles to con-
trol (and run) the business politically started to become very heated and 
violent. By then all the logistic operations related to the traffic – from 
the cutting of the wood to its transportation to major ports in Chennai, 
Calcutta, Kochi and Mumbai and then shipment abroad – required the 
pro-active intervention of Rayalaseema politicians and state agents, and 
a level of impunity that could be achieved only by an electoral victory. The 
concept of ‘mafia’, defined as the product of the encounter between prof-
itable violent criminal activities and politics (see the Introduction to this 
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volume), captures the entanglement (intreccio) of electoral politics and 
the criminal economy that I will go on to describe in this chapter,5 specif-
ically the local red sanders mafia developed by building upon vernacular 
forms of democracy (Michelutti 2008) and the structure of the informal/
illegal economies that are typical of the region. Far from being identical 
across the world, informal/illegal economies reflect assemblages of local 
cultural, political and social elements. More specifically the development 
of the red sanders mafia is the product of the transformation of deeply 
entrenched cultures of political factionalism and related ideas and prac-
tices of leadership, as I will explore below. In addition, the importance of 
the socio-cultural context in shaping the international traffic in local red 
sanders is further illustrated by the mobilisation of the Veerappan myth. 
Veerappan was a sandalwood smuggler who allegedly killed 120 police 
officers and kidnapped famous cinema megastars. He was murdered by a 
Special Task Force in 2004. For the police he was a criminal, while parts 
of the local tribal population viewed him as a ‘social bandit’. Veerappan 
used to control entire forests on the Tamil Nadu and the Karnataka bor-
ders, thanks to police and political protection. While his fame flourishes 
across India and beyond, through cartoons, movies and even global com-
mercial branding, he carries on shaping the representations (and work-
ings) of regional criminal political economies. Throughout this chapter 
I will pay particular attention to the social and political mobilisation 
of this mythological figure and the ways it is currently deployed by the 
police to criminalise labourers and justify their killings. This, together 
with an exploration of the careers of key violent criminal figures cur-
rently involved in the red sanders mafia, will offer insights into the mate-
rial organisation of the red sanders smuggling organisation, recruitment 
processes and the role of electoral democracy in determining internal 
hierarchies and structures of power. This paper relies on ethnographic 
fieldwork on criminal politics and businesses conducted in the district of 
Chittoor between 2012 and 2017. It combines methods like participant 
observation, informal and formal interviews and secondary sources like 
media and NGO reports.
The emergence of the red sanders mafia
The history of Rayalaseema, and its representations in the media, movies 
and music, is characterised by a focus on the violent struggles between 
faction leaders. From the paregallu (‘the ones who rule’) who emerged 
after the fall of the Vijayanagara Empire in the sixteenth century and 
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maintained their dominance by keeping their own armies, to the con-
temporary democratic faction politics, Rayalaseema has been mainly 
studied through a political lens (Subrahmanyam 1986). The recent polit-
ical history of Andhra Pradesh is shaped by the opposition between two 
landowning castes: the Reddys, portrayed as a caste of politicians, and 
the Kammas, a caste of business people. Both castes benefitted from the 
agrarian reforms in the 1960s and used it to reinforce their political and 
economic dominance in Rayalaseema. They were also able to diversify 
their activities and branch out into the arms industry, the construction 
sector, the illegal alcohol trade and the management of petrol pumps, 
the latter being seen as a cash cow. While the Reddys could rely on their 
domination over the Congress party to control state resources, the Kam-
mas contested their political power by joining the Communist party and 
then by launching their own caste-based political vehicle, the Telugu 
Desam party (TDP), in 1982. Success was immediate: they won the 
state elections in 1983. Since then, the two political parties (Congress 
and TDP) have alternated in government (Prasad 2015). The regional 
political landscape changed after the death in 2009 of the Congress Chief 
Minister, the charismatic leader Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy (known as YSR). 
His son, Jagan Mohan Reddy, allegedly one of the most corrupt Indian 
politicians and a famous figure in the criminalisation of Indian politics 
(Still 2018; Vaishnav 2017),6 then launched his own political party, the 
YSR Congress party. In the 1990s, this criminalisation was also made vis-
ible by the emergence of violent politician-businessmen from the Kamma 
and Reddy communities who partially challenged political dynasties. 
Murders, kidnapping and rackets were tools used to climb the political 
ladder and make huge profits in sectors such as mines, quarries and for-
ests. Elected as MLAs, they could exercise control over state resources, 
transfer bureaucrats, command local police forces and use licensed and 
unlicensed violence against opponents. Political violence was routinised. 
It is said to have led to 1,800 deaths over the past two decades. But Reddy 
and Kamma faction leaders are not only a provincial story. It should be 
noted that nine of the twelve Chief Ministers of the former (and united) 
state of Andhra Pradesh came from Rayalaseema (Picherit 2018).
Accounts of Rayalaseema political history have often neglected the 
economic aspects of faction politics. This illustration of the development 
of the red sanders mafia will highlight the role of the economy in shaping 
political violence and electoral politics in this part of the world. While 
small criminals – loosely related to political parties or the Maoist guer-
rilla – entered into the red sanders business at the end of the 1990s, the 
real big business developed after the election of YSR as Chief Minister in 
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2004. Nevertheless, it is his son Jagan, known for the fortune he made 
during his father’s term, who has often been credited for scaling up the 
red sanders traffic. After YSR’s death, Jagan lost the parliamentary elec-
tions with his new political party; his political opponents, Kiran Kumar 
Reddy (Congress party) and his brother Kishore Reddy, became major 
actors in the red sanders traffic. Controlling the red sanders business 
guarantees funding not only for henchmen, party workers and for politi-
cal campaigns but also for private accumulation. Indeed, as I will detail, 
many of the conflicts that from the outside may be seen to be moved by 
‘politics’ were actually closely related to the red sanders economy. All the 
politicians I have mentioned so far have their constituencies in the vicin-
ity of the Seshachalam forest.7 The forest’s spatial and political proximity 
to these figures could partly explain the silence and fear surrounding the 
red sanders business in the district of Chittoor, in stark contrast with the 
ways political violence is usually routinely and openly discussed. Most 
of my informants attempted to discourage any research: ‘The brother of 
Kiran Kumar Reddy [ex-CM of Congress party] is involved. The brother of 
the CM! He lives 50 kilometres away. Nobody will dare doing something. 
This is too dangerous.’ Another stated, ‘Nobody will talk about red sand-
ers. This is power, everybody fears them.’ Another party worker men-
tioned, ‘You should stop asking questions. The son and the brother of the 
two last Chief Ministers were involved. Now it is the turn of Chandrababu 
Naidu [leader of the TDP]’, one warned me. ‘No one can make a direct 
link between red sanders’ criminals and politicians: they use their party 
workers, their henchmen but they never involve directly.’
Smugglers’ careers
I will now start to unravel the linkages between politicians and the red 
sanders business by exploring a number of smugglers/politicians’ career 
trajectories, beginning with Kollam Gangi Reddy.
Kollam Gangi Reddy, a.k.a the Junior Veerappan
The role of electoral politics in shaping the red sanders mafia became 
clear a few days after the 2014 election results, when Kollam Gangi Reddy 
(KGR), a major player in red sanders traffic, had to escape to Dubai, Sin-
gapore and then Mauritius. The 2014 elections sanctioned the victory of 
Chandrababu Naidu – one of KGR’s public enemies. The criminal career 
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of KGR dovetails with the history of red sanders smuggling and faction 
politics, and is similar to the biographical trajectories of many other 
political figures in the region. He was born in a village in the Kadapa dis-
trict of Rayalaseema, a few kilometres away from YSR and Jagan Mohan 
Reddy. KGR began his career as a muscleman. His violent reputation 
was cemented in 1987 when he led a violent campaign in support of his 
brother’s candidacy in the Mandal panchayat elections. Two years later, 
he attacked some of his rivals using homemade bombs. He allegedly mur-
dered an industrialist in 1992. He escaped a life sentence in 1999 and 
thereafter dedicated himself to extortion and illegal alcohol production 
and trade.8 At the same time he joined the Naxalite guerrilla and entered 
‘clandestine life’ in the forest. According to various sources it was dur-
ing this period that he became involved in smuggling. At that time he 
started a partnership with Sahul Hameed, who is allegedly one of the 
international bosses of the business today, as I will explore below. KGR 
became famous at the national level when he was accused of taking part 
in a bomb attack against the then Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in 
Tirupati on 1 October 2003.9 This attack was allegedly funded by red 
sanders smugglers. Acquitted, KGR had gained a reputation for being a 
fearless ‘specialist’ in violence.
It was around 2004 that KGR moved his line of work from ‘politi-
cal violence’ to ‘economic crime’ by becoming a major actor in the red 
sanders mafia. Various media reports portray KGR as the master of the 
transnational transportation of red sanders, crediting him for introduc-
ing innovative smuggling methods and opening up new sea and terres-
trial routes (Times of India 2015a). The red sanders business made him 
a billionaire (Rangarajan and Venkat Sandeep 2015). He also became 
the owner of a barite mine in Mangampeta, a region of Kadapa where 
YSR, Chief Minister between 2004 and 2009, has illegally provided his 
supporters with mining authorisations. He also owns land and a variety 
of estates in the Rayalaseema region (Subramanyam 2015). It should be 
noted that politics has been central to KGR’s rise. Close to the Congress 
party, he greatly benefitted from the protection of YSR and then of Jagan 
Mohan Reddy, who carried on protecting the business after the death of 
his father. K. Gangi Reddy managed to secure his position when a for-
mer follower of YSR, Kiran Kumar Reddy, became the new Chief Minister 
in 2012. Despite the competition between Jagan Mohan Reddy (YSR 
Congress party) and Kiran Kumar Reddy (Congress party), one could 
suggest that there was an agreement to maintain the red sanders busi-
ness in the hands of the Reddys, as a caste.
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The position of KGR became insecure during the 2014 electoral 
campaign, when he was nicknamed the ‘Junior Veerappan’ by the 
Kamma candidate, Chandradabu Naidu. The first serious threat materi-
alised when police officers arrested him after the seizure of 2,000 red 
sanders logs (worth INR 5 crore) in Rayalaseema on 5 April 2014 – one 
month before the elections (Umashanker 2015). He was granted bail 
by the high court on 16 May 2014 and escaped to Mauritius with a fake 
passport. Just a few days after his election, Chandrababu Naidu wrote a 
letter to the governor to urge him to arrest KGR. This enmity was prob-
ably related to the 2003 bomb attack. On 24 February 2015, KGR was 
arrested in Mauritius and extradited to India. His arrest brought to light 
the entangled complicities of state officials and politicians in the red 
sanders business. According to the Andhra Pradesh police investigations, 
several Rayalaseema police inspectors and deputy superintendents had 
been bribed with money, gifts and villas in exchange for impunity. In 
short, the rise and fall of Kollam Gangi Reddy shows the trajectory of a 
criminal career that started by offering ‘muscle’ in the context of violent 
faction politics and then gradually shifted to the running of an illegal 
global trade. His biography illustrates how criminals do not necessarily 
enter directly into politics by contesting elections but rather often rely on 
the protection of politicians to carry on their illegal activities.
Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy: from contractor to minister/
smuggler
KGR’s career trajectory is not the only path to red sanders smuggling. 
Unlike KGR, Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy (PRR) was a small contrac-
tor directly involved in politics. For a long time, getting access to public 
contracts has been a successful route to financial accumulation and enter-
ing politics in this part of the world. Many regional politicians started their 
careers as small contractors in the construction, mines and alcohol sectors. 
An exploration of PRR’s ‘contractor’ career shows that it is very difficult 
to distinguish between business and politics – the two activities are fused 
together. After starting his career by contracting illegal alcohol, in the late 
1970s he became a civil contractor for irrigation projects. In 1978, he con-
tested the MLA state elections in Pileru constituency, located close to the 
Seshachalam forest. He lost the elections but by contesting them he con-
solidated his name and reputation on the local political/business map.10 
In 1989, he again contested and finally won the elections. His new polit-
ical position allowed him to further expand his subcontracting activities 
to road construction, railways and then mining, mostly granite. Despite 
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another defeat in 1994, his company, PLR Projects, continued to grow, and 
became a major asset for his subsequent electoral victories in 1999 and 
2004 in the Pileru constituency. However, this source of funding was not 
enough to maintain his elected post in the long run. In 2009, following 
the merging of two constituencies, the ticket for Pileru was given to his 
local Congress party enemy, Kiran Kumar Reddy. Kiran Kumar Reddy’s 
family is extremely influential locally. His father was a minister in P.V. 
Narasimha Rao’s cabinet between 1971 and 1973. PRR had then to move 
to Punganur – 50 kilometres away – to be elected again as MLA in 2009. 
Eventually he managed to become Minister of Forests and Environment in 
2010. It is common knowledge that this is the perfect political position to 
exploit forests resources and ‘make money’. As the Minister of Forests and 
Environment he expanded his red sanders smuggling activities by offer-
ing protection. This phase of his career was brief, however. The then Chief 
Minister resigned, and his enemy Kiran Kumar Reddy was elected in 2012. 
As a consequence, Kiran Kumar Reddy’s brother, N. Kishore Kumar Reddy, 
emerged as the new leader of the red sanders business. It is at this point 
that PRR left the Congress party to join Jagan Mohan Reddy and the YSR 
Congress party. The transition was not peaceful. The struggle between N. 
Kishore Kumar Reddy and PRR started in 2011 and spilled into a series 
of non-investigated murders in the Seshachalam forest. The murders were 
related to red sanders activities. Varaadi, a Tamil close to Kishore Kumar 
Reddy, was allegedly killed by forest officers who were allegedly controlled 
by PRR at the time. This murder was followed by the killings of two wood-
cutters (also Tamil) in December 2012. These murders were allegedly car-
ried out to stop red sanders resources falling into the hands of PRR.11 The 
use of legitimate state force to regulate faction politics and criminal econ-
omies is not new in Rayalaseema. The CM, Kiran Kumar Reddy, in June 
2013 replied to the murders by implementing a task force, which killed 
another labourer in 29 January 2014.
Exploring the life of PRR unveils the importance of local politics in 
the organisation of the red sanders mafia. What we witness is the use of 
licensed and unlicensed violence and related political electoral manoeu-
vres between the Congress party (Kiran Kumar Reddy) and YSR Congress 
party (Jagan Mohan Reddy). The situation changed after the 2014 elec-
tions with the victory of Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP. PRR, whose 
assets rose from 4 to 63 crore between 2009 and 201412, won the YSR 
Congress party seat in his constituency. He also helped other local MLAs 
to be elected, like in Madanapalle where I met him, and aided his own 
son to become a member of parliament (YSR Congress party). However, 
PRR is now isolated. His second term in the opposition party reduces his 
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influence, and various informants told me that many of his henchmen 
and followers involved in red sanders traffic have now joined the TDP. 
This shift is explained by the number of arrests of smugglers who are not 
affiliated to TDP. As Venkataïah, the henchman of a YSR Congress party 
leader, explained: ‘P. Ramachandra Reddy is in the opposition and has no 
contracts anymore and no impunity. What to do? Going to jail or moving 
to TDP and continuing business?’
From small contractor to minister, PRR’s career highlights the entan-
glement of business, politics and violence, as well as the importance of 
electoral democracy for controlling and governing the red sanders mafia. 
The two different careers I have so far presented highlight varieties of 
relations between politics and crime: Kollam Gangi Reddy is a criminal 
related to politics while Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy is a criminal 
politician-businessman. Both depend, however, on electoral politics to 
survive in the business.
The red sanders mafia organisation
‘Veerappan forest’: labour force, migration, intermediaries 
and transport
How can tonnes of illegally cut red sanders be transported by road across 
India and then by air and/or by ship to China without being stopped? 
Answering this question will further shed light on the red sanders mafia 
organisation. So far, we have explored the linkages with politics and the 
red sanders business. In this section we move on to explore the deep 
continuities of the red sanders mafia with the Indian informal economy. 
Smuggling red sanders requires a sophisticated organisation. It involves 
traders and a variety of agents and labour contractors who are capable 
of monitoring the collection of wood. Once the wood is cut, it is hidden 
in safe places and then loaded into vans or trucks with fake registration. 
Police checkpoints need to be crossed during transportation to the ports, 
and port customs need also to be passed. Finally, for transportation via 
sea, ships need to be found and managed. Importantly all these opera-
tions require the active participation of police and custom officers. Smug-
gling red sanders requires political support and control, and bureaucrats 
committed to getting things done for the ‘red sanders mafia’ (Nemana 
2015; NCDNTHR 2014).13 It requires woodcutters. The business relies 
heavily on male migrant labour from tribal and Dalit castes originating 
mostly (but not exclusively) from the Jawadi hills of the neighbouring 
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state of Tamil Nadu.14 These labourers are widely known to have the 
special skills needed to work with timber and are experienced working 
in difficult forest conditions. However, there are also other factors that 
explain the use of labourers from Tamil Nadu rather than local ones.15 
Firstly local labourers tend not to get involved in the wood cutting busi-
ness because they are aware of the dangers that working for the red sand-
ers mafia involves. As a local NGO leader I met near the Seshachalam 
forest explained: ‘Local labourers are aware of the consequences, the 
stakes and the tensions regarding red sanders smuggling. It has become a 
highly political issue and dangerous. Many local people refuse to work in 
the forest.’ Secondly Dalit and tribal migrant labourers from Tamil Nadu 
are considered ‘special’. They are viewed as fearless due to their alleged 
history of criminality and linkages with the famous Veerappan. It follows 
that labour contractors use the brand ‘Veerappan forest’ to promote the 
skills of their Tamil labourers and negotiate better wages for them. This 
branding, while being an advantage when negotiating labour wages, also 
facilitates criminalising migrants. The Veerappan myth has been used 
by the police to legitimise the killing of ‘smugglers’ who originate from 
‘areas previously controlled by the famous smuggler’. As of today, as I 
shall further explore in the next section, more than 2,000 Dalit and tribal 
labour migrant woodcutters from Tamil Nadu have been jailed (Janyala 
2018).
Going back to the red sanders mafia organisation, labour contrac-
tors are in charge of organising shelter, food and water in the hamlets 
and villages in the Seshachalam forest, and manage the working sched-
ules. The labourers cut the trees, then carry and hide the logs in the local 
ravines. Most labourers are paid by weight (between INR 20 to INR 40 per 
kg). They are paid when they return to Tamil Nadu. In the Seshachalam 
forest labourers are extremely isolated from the surrounding areas. In 
Chandragiri, a small town close to the forest, one activist mentioned: 
‘We never see them, we never meet them. They come at night and stay 
isolated in the forest.’ The invisibility of migrant labourers is common 
in India; however, in the case of the red sanders mafia it is even more 
pronounced due to the illegal dimension of their activities.
The red sanders criminal economy is similar in many ways to how 
the Indian construction sector is organised (Picherit 2009). The isolation 
of labourers, the existence of multiple middlemen, the inter-state charac-
ter of the labours, and the ways their payment is delayed until they are 
back in their villages of origin are not unique features of the red sanders 
sector. Similar to the case of the construction business, the recruitment 
of migrant labourers by labour intermediaries has a major advantage: 
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labourers know who their liaison is and respond only to his authority, but 
they often have no idea about who their real employer is. This structure 
is even more critical in the red sanders criminal economy, where there is 
an extra need to impede the circulation of information and prevent single 
individuals from having a clear view of the different layers of the mafia 
organisation. This model is very useful because it prevents anyone from 
giving information to the police. This is particularly important in the 
transportation phase of the business. Transportation requires major logis-
tics and the organisation of drivers, 4x4s and lorries, impunity at forest 
check posts and police check posts. It requires good quality and updated 
intelligence. Members of the organisation need to be directly connected 
to the officers who are in charge of monitoring transport to major Indian 
ports, such as Chennai, Calcutta, Mumbai or Kochi. Sources from human 
rights organisations and/or the police have documented some of these 
organisational aspects. For example, once the wood is loaded a first pilot 
on a motorcycle drives ahead to check that there are no police and for-
est patrols along the way and keeps the truck driver informed by mobile 
phone. In case of problems, another car with an agent is always ready to 
intervene with money and bribe police or forest guards if necessary. ‘One 
fellow spends INR 5 lakh to give it to the next fellow, who spends another 
INR 5 lakh until the next stage, and so on so a lot of money trickles down,’ 
declared the Chief Forest Officer in the Seshachalam forest in the local 
media. ‘They’re so organised that the drivers don’t know the identities of 
who they’re working with. So even if we catch them we can’t get to the 
other links in the chain.’ (Nemana 2015).
Transnational smugglers
There is a lack of substantial information about the international dimen-
sion of the business and its linkages with local politics in Rayalaseema. 
Discussions with informants reveal more about the fabric of rumours, 
fantasy and fictions of power than factual knowledge of the transna-
tional organisation. There is also a huge gap between the very detailed 
and pervasive analysis of how the red sanders business is embedded in 
Rayalaseema politics postulated by journalists who are not silenced by 
the landscape of violent and criminal political economies and the con-
tradictory and spectacular news about the global dimension of the busi-
ness.16 It is known from police investigations that before reaching their 
final destination, red sanders logs are stored in godowns or in farmhouses 
near major ports (M.K. Kumar 2014). The entire operation relies on the 
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complicity of police and customs agents who facilitate the smuggling by 
affixing government seals to containers, thereby making them ‘legal’.17 
Smugglers are then said to register the containers – with fake informa-
tion about the product to be exported – and have the final seal approved 
by the Customs and Central Excise Department. The containers are then 
taken to the godowns. In one case near Pune, on the road to Mumbai port, 
it was reported that once the containers were marked with customs seals, 
smugglers opened and loaded them with the red sanders. They then sent 
the wood back to Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust in Mumbai and got clear-
ance to export their produce on cargo ships as ‘agricultural products’ (or 
plywood, rubber mats or other material in other cases).18 Even should the 
police manage to seize the smuggled wood, negotiation remains possible. 
Twenty tonnes of red sandalwood worth INR 3 crore were seized by the 
Local Crime Branch (LCB) Officer of the Pune rural police, but instead of 
arresting the smugglers, police officers allegedly demanded INR 1 crore 
from the smugglers (Kulkarni 2013).
According to environmental NGOs such as TRAFFIC, the smug-
gling of red sanders is part of a wider illegal trade in sandalwood 
within India and also in Africa and Australia (International Animal 
Rescue Foundation 2013). Those organisations tend to insist less on 
the everyday working of the trade than on the ‘spectacular’ elements 
and believe that red sanders smugglers use techniques deployed in 
the illegal drug trade, like painstakingly strapping a small container 
loaded with red sanders to the underside of a ship. These methods 
involve constant adjusting to ever-changing regulations, routes and 
new business opportunities, such as the recent implementation of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the area. The SEZ in Kochi exem-
plifies the possibilities offered by later forms of capitalism to the 
local criminal economy. As mentioned in the official website of the 
SEZ, ‘The Cochin [Kochi] SEZ is a foreign territory in India. Legally, 
it stands outside the customs territory of India. This positioning per-
mits both fast project approvals in the SEZ as well as a hassle-free 
environment for running units in the SEZ.’19 Yet the directorate of rev-
enue intelligence (DRI) complains that the work of the police in this 
SEZ is seriously hampered by this legislation. In these ‘zones’ smug-
glers can practise their illegal operations without being harassed. The 
rare seizures of containers illegally shipped from the port to various 
parts of China look like police operations mainly performed for the 
media. In addition, arrests seem to have a limited deterrent effect. 
There is no confiscation of the assets of smugglers and smuggling is 
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not a non-bailable offence (see Kollam Gangi Reddy, mentioned pre-
viously) (Reddy 2014b).
Police investigations highlight some of the profiles of smugglers at 
international levels and the ways they play with borders and roads, draw-
ing new maps across and within the interstices of official ones. Shahul 
Hameed is one of these big traffickers. He is said to have taken the lead 
in the business after A.T. Maideen, a gang leader who smuggled out red 
sanders to China and Hong Kong via Dubai, was arrested (Reddy 2014a). 
But not much is known about Shahul Hameed. A Singaporean citizen, 
he used to operate from Chennai, where he was arrested in 2004 by cus-
toms officials. However, when released on bail, he escaped and started to 
operate from Dubai. In 2011, the DRI seized his red sanders containers in 
Kochi port. Hameed is also believed to fund Kollam Gangi Reddy’s career. 
Hameed’s name featured in the press in May 2015 when 100 smugglers 
from Tamil Nadu and AP flew to the UAE to attend his daughter’s wed-
ding, even though the Chittoor and Tirupati police tried to stop them at 
the airport (Reddy 2015).
Despite the limited information, a number of crucial dimensions of 
the workings of red sanders international trafficking can be extrapolated. 
The first is the changing scale of the business in Rayalaseema and a shift 
from faction politics to regional criminal economies to transnational crime. 
The second point relates to the organisation of the business: the red sanders 
mafia necessarily builds on a strong state able to guarantee the circulation of 
trucks, the shipping of the wood logs and the control of the customs. State 
agents are omnipresent in the trade, implying the need to have politicians in 
key positions who are able to control and command bureaucrats and ensure 
the smooth collection and transportation of the red sanders.
The ghost of Veerappan and the criminalisation of labour
A striking point of the red sanders mafia is how a dead smuggler like 
Veerappan haunts and pervades the representations and practices of 
this criminal economy, from labour organisation and police investigation 
to public opinion. As Moffat argues (2018, 180), some dead ‘appear as 
active interlocutors in ongoing political struggles’ and have important 
potential in contemporary politics. Veerappan is a powerful element in 
the local cultural repertoire of models of authority. A Robin Hood figure 
(Seal 2009) and protector of forests for some, the figure of Veerappan in 
South India epitomises the dangerous criminal for the state and the police 
forces. In doing so it also contributes to legitimising the criminalisation 
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of labourers and the use of state violence against labour in the context of 
the red sanders criminal economy. Therefore, Veerappan is mobilised by 
various actors involved in the business in a variety of ways – as an asset, 
as proof of guilt or innocence.
But the career of Veerappan also mirrors the changing alliance 
between politics, markets and violence in later forms of capitalism. These 
dynamics can be seen in two events in April 2015: the massacre of 20 
labourers by the Red Sanders Anti-Smuggling Task Force, followed by 
the decision to remove red sanders from the endangered list to make 
the business easier (Vadlapatla 2015). As early as July 2014, the Andhra 
Pradesh government was ready to sell red sanders at auction through 
global tenders (Economic Times 2014). In October and November 2014, 
the government prepared the first phase of the e-auctions of 4,000 tonnes 
(seized by police) to be sold at an average of INR 25 lakh per tonne. The 
change of rules in the business cannot be dissociated from the massacre 
of woodcutters. It is the combination of the private use of state violence 
with the manipulation of market regulations that unravels how electoral 
democracy is crucial in determining who is ruling and controlling the 
business. What we are witnessing from 2014 elections is not the end of 
smuggling but rather the emergence of a new leadership: the TDP (and 
the Kammas) have now entered the market. By changing the law, Naidu 
has stopped a solid source of finance for his own political opponents from 
the Congress party.
Smugglers vs. labourers
The categorisation of woodcutters as ‘smugglers’ has serious implications 
and Veerappan is the point of reference through which a variety of actors 
(from police to NGOs) seem to interpret, compare and evaluate red sand-
ers labourers. The ‘fact-finding report’ drafted and released in 2014 by 
the National Campaign for De-notified Tribes’ Human Rights (NCDN-
THR) highlights the conditions of workers, the roles of the Kammas and 
the Reddys in the organisation of the smuggling activities, and the ways 
labourers have been killed and jailed by the government.20 The attention 
paid to labour derives from the fact that woodcutters are the only ones 
killed and/or jailed in the red sanders economy: ‘About two thousand 
Tamilians are in Andhra jails because of the cases booked against them 
for red sanders smuggling’, according to a lawyer from Kadapa.21 He 
traces the history of the recruitment of the labour force and explains that 
the majority of the Tamilian coolies originate from areas surrounding the 
Jawadi hills, between Vellore and Tiruvannamalai districts (bordering 
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Chittoor district of Andhra Pradesh). He links their recruitment to the 
death of Veerappan: ‘These villages were once under the influence of 
notorious red sanders smuggler Veerappan. After the death of Veerap-
pan, the poor people who used to work for him were rendered jobless. 
This provided an opportunity for the Andhra smugglers to recruit them 
easily at cheap wages.’
The NCDNTHR’s narrative stresses historical continuities with 
Veerappan – despite the fact that Veerappan was not active in this part of 
Tamil Nadu. If the report does not support Veerappan, in other articles, 
tribal and Dalit Tamil woodcutters are, condescendingly, portrayed as 
poor, passive and ignorant tribal victims of a traffic organised by upper-
caste Andhra politicians (Narasimhan 2014). In this narrative they are 
exploited because of their tribal identity and they are killed and jailed 
because they are Tamil:
Those killed are only coolies engaged by contractors to cut trees at 
night under the cover of darkness. They are not smugglers. Young 
tribal men from Jawadi hills in Tiruvannamalai district of Tamil 
Nadu are lured by brokers with offer of fancy wages and pressed 
into extracting red sanders from the forests. (Rajappa 2015)
As mentioned above, the mafia can rely on the participation of labourers 
who do not know who’s who in the trade. Such lack of knowledge helps 
to protect the organisation. Human rights organisations contest the crim-
inalisation and the mass killings of labourers by the state by emphasis-
ing this aspect. By contrast police forces argue that labourers are active 
‘mafia’ workers coming from villages historically under the influence of 
Veerappan: ‘Top police officials based in Rayalaseema said that labour 
gangs employed by Veerappan to chop down sandalwood trees in the 
Satyamangalam forests are taking part in the red sanders smuggling in 
Seshachalam forests,’ states one source (Deccan Herald 2014). Police por-
tray them as active smugglers and rational followers of Veerappan and 
insist on their deep, historical and undercover engagement with him. As 
a police officer said: ‘These woodcutters are experts and after death of 
Veerappan in 2004 they were silent for few years. For the past five years 
they are coming to Andhra Pradesh and cutting the red sanders heav-
ily.’ This police perspective turns woodcutters into smugglers. Their geo-
graphical origin, their skills in woodcutting and their abilities to remain 
silent after Veerappan’s death are elements ‘top’ police officials attempt 
to link to each other: labourers are smugglers and mafia members. This 
view is reinforced by the alleged structural similarities of the methods of 
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red sanders smugglers to those employed by the late Veerappan. Another 
top police official said: ‘The supply chains, the intermediaries and the 
other methods used are exactly the same as with Veerappan. Most of 
the gangs are from Tamil Nadu and are intruding into AP. The issue is of 
serious concern as the smugglers are turning violent’ (Raghavan 2013). 
Whether as passive victims, followers or active smugglers, labourers are 
blamed for their alleged links with Veerappan, who continues to haunt 
red sanders smuggling over activities a decade after his death.
Mass killing of labourers
The Veerappan ‘brand’ came into force in public media when two forest 
officials were killed in the forest on 15 December 2013.22 Local newspa-
pers announced ‘Veerappan-style smugglers attack Tirumala rangers, 2 
officers stoned to death’ (Raghavan 2013). Other newspapers reported 
that the officials were stoned and hanged to death; others asserted that 
their genitals were cut off. Ultimately, woodcutters were portrayed as sav-
age and brutal. However, the association between smugglers and Veerap-
pan was popularly viewed with suspicion. ‘Will they go unarmed in the 
forest on their own, without any orders? They are not stupid,’ stated an 
informant. Others declared the necessary involvement of politics: ‘This is 
faction politics, elections are coming. Nothing to do with labour or forest 
officials.’
The representations of the state, democracy and politics among the 
local population often converge around a central position: it is impos-
sible to imagine the state and the police forces acting without political 
intervention. Bosses do give orders and the killings of tree cutters are 
necessarily related to power relations. As one bureaucrat stressed: ‘Forest 
officials do not go in the forest on their own; they knew electoral cam-
paigning was coming.’ These narratives highlight the interpretations of 
killings in terms of faction politics and echo official reports: ‘We suspect 
these two officials were not killed by the tree cutters and this is a handy 
work of the corrupt forest and police officials, in connivance with key 
smugglers and political bosses’(Raghavan 2013).
The visible criminalisation and killings of woodcutters contrast 
with the limited and less publicised investigations on the relations 
between smugglers and politicians. As mentioned, most of the top smug-
glers who have been charged were able to secure bail and escape. Those 
who are in jail still benefit from political support and receive visits from 
YSR Congress leaders like Midhun Reddy, member of parliament and son 
of Peddireddy Ramachandra Reddy. The mass killing of labourers had a 
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huge impact on the media (Nichenametla 2015). Police stated that the 
RSASTF had spotted a gang of 100 woodcutters from Tamil Nadu on the 
night of 6/7 April. When challenged, 20 of the woodcutters threw stones 
at them. The task force responded by shooting the 20 dead (Fact Finding 
Team 2015). Another report argues ironically about the unreality of 
the police version: ‘Kantha Rao’s men deserve President’s police medal 
for the accuracy they have shown in identifying the 20 stone-throwing 
woodcutters out of 100 in the dead of night without any night vision 
equipment.’ (Rajappa, 2015). RSASTF is also silent on what happened to 
the other 80 in the gang.
The use of licensed violence and state forces has long been a priv-
ilege of bosses and a major way of redefining the business map. What is 
striking is that this task force has worked as a private army for Naidu. 
Like paramilitary forces, they have full impunity and attacked only non-
TDP smugglers. Whatever the involvement of the leader, this conveyed 
a strong warning to YSRCP and Congress bosses involved in smuggling 
activities. Men like Peddireddy Ramchandra Reddy have a reputation 
that reaches far into villages and towns. They inspire fear and respect. 
A henchman said: ‘If you meet him, you should never turn your back 
and eat in his house. If something goes wrong, you will get poisoned. 
Everybody fears him.’ With the rise to power of Chandrababu Naidu and 
his uses of the task force, the fear has changed direction: ‘Even Peddireddy 
Ramchandra Reddy is scared now.’ The denial of any rights, the disposal 
of the labour force and bodies and the complete lack of protection are the 
crude extension of informal economies (Shah et al. 2017).
Conclusion
This chapter illustrates how current criminal economies, based on 
alliances between markets, politics, state and violence, have led to a 
criminalisation of labour and a marked shift from political violence to 
economic violence in Andhra Pradesh, South India. The history of red 
sanders traffic highlights the transformation of the local sandalwood 
economy into a criminal, international mafia-like activity. I showed the 
crucial role of electoral democracy (and criminalisation of politics and 
politicisation of crime) in shaping the governance of the red sanders 
mafia and also stressed how its regulation is deeply entrenched in the 
economic, cultural and political history of Rayalaseema. The latter is 
further illustrated by the ways the mythical figure of Veerappan is used 
to negotiate labour, violence and justice in the region. Local criminal 
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economies are further entrenched in the local socio-political contexts 
through the logics of intermediation typical of the local informal econ-
omy. Such dynamics help to maintain the silence and secrecy necessary 
to protect the workings of the red sanders mafia. Lastly, I showed how 
the red sanders business is unstable and always dependent on electoral 
politics and changes in the laws. However, these uncertainties are also 
the basis for the making (or losing) of personal fortunes and for making 
the red sanders business a ‘gamble’ worth hundreds of crores.
Notes
 1. Red sanders is protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) of Wild Fauna and Flora (1995) and has been listed as endangered by the Internation-
al Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) since 1998.
 2. ‘Encounter’ reflects the licence delivered to police and army forces to kill unarmed civilians 
with impunity, notably alleged ‘Naxalites’ in Andhra Pradesh.
 3. For the report see NCDNTHR 2014.
 4. The state of Andhra Pradesh separated from the Telangana region in 2014.
 5. See also P.S. Jha, quoted in the Introduction.
 6. During his father’s term, his fortune rose from 10 lakh in 2004 to 72 crore in 2009, and to 400 
crore in 2014 (Vaishnav 2017, 28).
 7. The constituency of the ex-Chief Minister YSR and his son Jagan is located in Kadapa district, 
100 kilometres from the Seshachalam forest; the constituency of the ex-Chief Minister, Kiran 
Kumar Reddy, and his brother Kishore is adjacent to the forest in Chittoor district. Chandraba-
bu Naidu, the 2014 elected CM, is also based in Chittoor district.
 8. To follow the details of the case, see Indian Kanoon (1999).
 9. Chandrababu Naidu was Chief Minister between 1995 and 2004 and then from 2014 to the 
time of publication.
10. P. Ramachandra Reddy contested elections for the Janata party in 1978 and for the Congress 
party in 1985 and lost on both occasions.
11. For a detailed list of woodcutters killed see M.K. Kumar (2014) and NCDNTHR (2014).
12. For official details, see National Election Watch (n.d.).
13. See also Vadlapatla 2015.
14. A detailed report published in 2014 (M.K. Kumar 2014) states that ‘woodcutters come from 
Thrivullaur, Vellore, Krishnagiri, Thiruvannamalai, Kancheepuram, and Villupuram of Tamil 
Nadu and are supposedly brought by middlemen from Thiruvannamalai and Salem districts’. 
A detailed news report published in Frontline mentions they are mostly ‘Vannyars and Malayali 
Scheduled Tribe hailed from the border districts of Salem, Dharmapuri, Krishnagiri, Tiruvan-
namalai and Vellore in Tamil Nadu’ (Rajasekaran 2015).
15. The characteristics of Indian informal labour markets are well known (Breman 1996; Har-
riss-White 2003; Basile and Harriss-White 2010), usually presenting strong segmentation by 
caste, class, gender and geographical origins. Often labour migration is used to reduce man-
power costs and to avoid the application of labour laws. Generally economic sectors present 
multiple layers of intermediation and of subcontracting. Therefore, in this economy it is com-
mon to observe migrant labourers, often of a specific caste and/or region, brought by labour 
intermediaries to work sites.
16. The silence of the population about the red sanders mafia contrasts with the possibility for 
some journalists to cover and expose the red sanders mafia.
17. It remains unclear if they used duplicate seals or brought customs officials in to affix the seals.
18. According to media coverage, this information came to light during questioning of the customs 
clearance agent-turned-smuggler. The directorate of revenue intelligence (DRI) had earlier 
arrested him in 2010 for allegedly smuggling red sanders worth INR 5.03 crore to Dubai. He 
was released from jail in August last year.
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19. See the official website at http://www.csez.com/softwares/cedis.htm (accessed 12 February 
2018).
20. The committee was made up of advocates, tribal leaders and intellectuals from Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, convened to ‘investigate the death and arrest of thousands of mem-
bers of de-notified tribes from Tamil Nadu during the anti-smuggling operations by the police 
in Andhra Pradesh’ (NCDNTHR 2014).
21. See also Times of India 2015b.
22. A few examples of press headlines: ‘Veerappan Gone, But his Group Still Active in Seshachalam 
Forests’ and ‘It Bore Veerappan Mark’.
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